Abstract
Introduction
Electronic mail (email) systems have been widely accepted in industry, business and academia as a useful medium for interpersonal communication. However, these are passive systems in that information is static and can only be 'displayed' or 'stored' at the recipient's end. An extension is to make the mail 'active' so that what is sent is in fact an embedded computer program or interpretable script that can be executed. A system that supports such 'active' mails is known as a Computational Electronic mail (CEmail) system.
The 'active' part of a CEmail can be constructed in two ways. It can be composed and compiled into an executable form at the sender's end, then transported to the recipient's end where it will execute upon activation by the recipient. In the second way, it is expressed in an interpreted language (e.g. Tcl/Tk [1] , UNIX shells [2] , Safe -Tcl [3] , and JAVA [4] ) and contained in a script file which requires no compilation at run time. The script file is transmitted, loaded and executed at the recipient's end. The first approach requires that the 'active' mail be compiled for execution on the recipient's machine that may have a different configuration and operating system. For this reason, the second approach is preferred. As long as appropriate interpreters are available on different users' computers, executing a CEmail poses no problem. However, this approach is generally slower in execution due to the interpretation required.
In this article, factors that are believed to be hindering wider acceptance of CEmail will be described briefly; security concerns are then brought out through understanding the nature of CEmail applications followed by possible measures for improving security in CEmail systems.
Computational Mail Systems
The concept of CEmail is not new. Early works by Vittal [5] , Hogg [6] , Borenstein [7] , Hansen [8] and Shepherd [9] have demonstrated the idea of embedding computation in email and showed its application in many areas. These pioneering systems aimed to prove the feasibility and potential of the CEmail concept and did not adequately address the issues of generality, conformity, portability and security [10] .
A CEmail system offers generality if it can support the creation of a general range of applications. Generality is lost if the applications are too specific and lack extensibility. A possible solution is to adopt an existing language with strong expressibility for the composition (hence execution) of computational mail.
Conformity to standards ensures inter-connectivity and inter-operability between systems. Therefore, if CEmail is to be accepted on a large -scale basis, then it should be compatible with current passive electronic mail systems and support standard forms of mail transport mechanism (e.g. Internet's SMTP [11] ) and mail structure (e.g. MIME [12] ).
Portability refers to the ability of a CEmail system to operate in a heterogeneous environment where machines with different hardware and software configurations co-exist. CEmail systems should be open systems to benefit the maximum number of users. Portability can be achieved through the presence and use of standardised tools or languages.
Security refers to the extent to which both the sender and the recipient of a message can be protected against undesirable and possibly detrimental consequences caused by malicious attacks. It is an aspect where virtually no compromise is acceptable. Secur ity needs special consideration or it can conflict with generality considerations. At such, certain measures for enhancing security can restrict the resources available to embedded codes. This has a direct impact on the usability of CEmail systems. Some users are likely to prefer a system that does less but is more secure.
A second generation of CEmail systems has addressed most of these factors in their design and implementation. Examples of these systems include ATOMICMAIL [10] , Computational Mail tool [13] , CEmail [14] and SAMAT [15] . Generality is achieved by adopting languages such as LISP in ATOMICMAIL, Safe -Tcl in CEmail, Tcl/TK in SAMAT and JAVA in Computational Mail tool. Conformity is ensured since all these systems basically support the Internet standard of mail transportation and structure. Likewise, these systems have been developed using languages that are supported on all major platforms including PCs, UNIX workstations and Macintoshes. Security is achieved to some extent by the use of 'safe' languages such as Safe-Tcl (which was specially written for CEmail purposes) and JAVA (for safe interaction of World-Wide-Web documents) and 'safe' operating environment. As these are basically non-production systems, security was not a main goal in the delivery of these systems.
Computational Mail Applications
CEmail has numerous applications in almost any conceivable situation involving the use of information technology. The fact that CEmail can also include multimedia and other media types will in turn, open up a host of new application areas that can harness the power of computational mail to bring information and programs directly to users. CEmail applications can be broadly defined in the three areas of electronic forms, instructional or informational mails, and intelligent agents. CEmail can be used as electronic forms that will interactively obtain information from the user. Applications range from simple automation functions such as library loan renewals (Figure 1 ), meeting schedulers, high school subject registration and payment ( Figure 2 ) to survey generators and mail order catalogues. Using CEmail as a means to conduct surveys is particularly attractive. This paperless process is more efficient and effective than the existing paper or telephone surveys. Delivery and collection of survey data is fast as it uses the electronic mail transport mechanism. Surveys can include multimedia data and questions can be tagged as compulsory questions to ensure responses from the user. As such, only 'valid' survey returns are collected with the data available in a form ready for further processing. Figure 3 is accompanied by a training session to teach the user how to carry out such a computation for tax reporting purposes. The banking example of Figure 4 invites the user to visit the World -Wide-Web (WWW) document for new product announcements. The WWW that heralded the Internet revolution and brought commercialism into cyberspace is transformed from a passive system into an active system by the use of this tool. A user simply needs to select the option and a Web browser will be automatically started to load the corresponding Web document. Intelligent Agents. Intelligent agents are CEmail programs that execute at the recipient's machine to carry out a sequence of tasks, either autonomously or semi-autonomously with user intervention. It can be applied for customer support or service applications to insert, request, update or extract information from the recipient's system. Figure 5 shows an example to 'repair' a reported software fault by automatically installing a new configuration or patch file into the recipient's system.
Security Concerns
It is obvious that a powerful language with strong expressibility also implies that permission for embedded code to access various facilities is required. This fact gives a malicious party additional means to launch silent attacks to the recipient's system that often goes undetected. Common security threats include those of mail interception or tapping during transmission, impersonation, introduction of computer virus, Trojan horse and related problems through CEmail execution [16] .
It is easy to embed malicious code in a message to bring detrimental effects (e.g. data erasure) on the recipient's machine. However, the total effect of embedded codes in a message is not always obvious to the recipient. Confidential data on the recipient's machine may be 'silently stolen' and forwarded to a party who is otherwise unable to access them. Executable programs infected with viruses or other Trojan Horse software may be quietly copied into the recipient's machine, and their impact take place only at a (possibly much) later stage when the recipient activates them. The recipient's machine may be led by some embedded code to send a message, in the name of the innocent recipient, to a third party that may incur liability consequences unknown to but bored by the recipient. Many other undersirable consequences are conceivable.
Without built-in protection, malicious codes embedded in a message do not necessarily originate from the sender stated in the message. In an open network such as the Internet, a message can be intercepted and modified by a third party. Technically sophisticated hackers are also capable of impersonating an otherwise innocent sender. Confidential data can also be 'silently stolen' by a third party who is eavesdropping the network.
It must be obvious that the costs incurred by destructive consequences in using these systems can be unquantifiably high. Despite the potential of CEmail systems, they have not taken off in a big way as its ASCII text-only counterpart! Of the four cited concerns of generality, conformity, portability and security, we believe that security is the main obstacle that has impeded large -scale acceptance of such systems as recipients are particularly concerned with the potentially destructive consequences of mail execution.
Techniques And Approaches To Improve Security in CEmail Systems
We shall examine a number of techniques and approaches that can be used to improve the security aspects of computational mail. Various combinations of these techniques can be adopted depending on security needs.
• Protection via Cryptographical Techniques. Lost of confidential information due to silent eavesdropping can be prevented by means of the technique of digital envelope as adopted in the Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) Standard [17, 18] . It is essentially a time -varying transformation of data into a form unreadable or undecipherable by anyone without an appropriate (and possibly secret) piece of information which is possessed by or available only to the intended recipient(s). A sender requires the 'public key' of the intended recipient in order to achieve this operation. This can be obtained from a trusted certification authority within the PEM certification management architecture. Digital enveloping ensures data confidentiality but cannot prevent senders from repudiating his or her authorship of malicious code embedded in a message. This latter concern is addressed by the technique of digital signature [17, 19] which is also adopted in the PEM standard. Within the PEM specification, the digital signature of a message can only be created using a 'private key' known only to the sender. It is computationally infeasible and hence practically impossible for any one without this private key to forge the signature associated with a given message. Whoever in possession of the message and the corresponding signature can obtain the 'public key' of the sender from a trusted certification authority, and use it to verify the authenticity and integrity of the message. Availability of a copy of a signed message permits a victimised recipient of a message with embedded malicious code to seek compensation from the sender who 'signed' (i.e. originated) the message. An independent professional can analyse the effect of the embedded code and the sender cannot deny authorship of the code.
Both digital enveloping and digital signature techniques use a combination of asymmetric and symmetric encryption techniques [19] . They also incur some, though not significant, processing overhead needed for obtaining the public keys of the sender/recipient from certificate authorities and for performing the necessary encryption operations. These techniques are also applicable to communications involving large groups of recipients and/or senders although the overhead will be increased proportionately. For example, a company can broadcast a 'signed' active surveyform to all participants. Each participant can then respond and send the duly 'signed' completed survey-form in an 'envelop' created using the company public key. We note in passing that the commonly used password mechanism for ensuring that a mail is from a verifiable source do not provide protection in the two aspects discussed. A password can be intercepted while travelling on the network; and a program masquerading as the authentication program and asking for the password are possible ways to capture the password for eventual illegitimate use. However, it must be noted that cryptographical techniques alone do not provide complete protection. In particular, if the effect of the embedded code include self-erasure or self-destruction after all other undesirable (perhaps harmful) effects are executed, coupled with all intermediate hosts routing the message to the intended recipient not recording the message, then no one would possess 'evidence' to prove that the sender has ever send such a message even though the victimised recipient have verified the authenticity of the message prior to the detrimental consequences.
• Secure Scripting Language or Interpreter. If a better and suitable scripting language or interpreter is used for CEmail, then the possible damages caused by security problems can be significantly minimised as well. A good scripting language should provide strategic locations where security measures can be added to restrict the power of CEmail. At the same time, flexibility should be allowed to provide more privilege to the CEmail upon the discretion of the user. Although, such languages as Safe-TCL and JAVA exist, these are still at their infancy stage with scope for further improvements.
In addition, some form of security manager (or master interpreter) to monitor the actions of the program at runtime may be included to ensure that no 'dangerous' commands are silently executed. For instance, an 'open' command can easily be detected at runtime prior to execution regardless of how it has been constructed in the script and disallowed by the security manager.
A set of user-defined new but safe commands may be created and managed by the security manager. For example, a safe_read command may be defined to replace the 'open' and 'read' command. The active mail may subsequently use safe_read to read the contents of a file on the recipient's machine. Whe n this request is detected, the security manager will be responsible to open, read and subsequently return the contents of the file to the requester. The requester obtains the desired information without accessing the file system directly but through the security manager.
Unknown user-defined commands shall not be allowed to execute. Thus, commands are confined to those maintained by the security manager who controls fully the execution of such commands. As a final precaution, all commands and corresponding parameters can optionally be communicated to the recipient prior to execution. The recipient must acknowledge and give the go-ahead before the command executes. Although this process hinders automation, it nevertheless keeps the recipient informed of each impeding action of the mail. Furthermore, an audit log of the complete sequence of CEmail execution is kept by the security manager.
All these improvements effectively controls what a CEmail can achieve at the recipient's machine and at the same time, ensures that commands are executed safely to achieve the desired operation. One must also emphasize that with the scripting language remaining flexible and powerful, a complex harmful sequence of actions that are composed of short and seemingly harmless commands may still be created by an ingenious attacker. There can be many if not infinite such possibilities and some may even have the final consolidated effect that span across several messages. It is practically impossible to detect all such possibilities.
• Improved Operating Environment.
The two operating systems (OS) that are likely to be used by the majority of CEmail applications are DOS and UNIX. However, these are two distinct OS with very different security characteristics. DOS is an open system that was designed for personal use. Little or no security features exist since it assumes that the owner will be the sole user with full access to the whole system. In contrast, the UNIX system was designed to support multiple users, time-sharing, and a networked environment. It can be configured into a much more secure system. When used in conjunction with CEmail, it offers more protection to the user than compared with DOS. For instance, the Access Control List mechanism, when used in the correct manner, can prevent a CEmail from tampering with the file system of the recipient's machine except for designated directories. It helps to protect other users in using CEmail under the same environment. Thus, UNIX is a preferred OS over DOS in executing CEmail applications.
In addition, if CEmail can run with a priority lower than an ordinary user then it will not be possible for it to assume the rights of the recipient unless it been explicitly given by the recipient. Thus, it becomes possible to ensure that the mail has no general purpose access to the file system, but only a limited form of access to a subset of the file system. The interpreter will ensure that no tricks (such as '..' or symbolic links in UNIX) can be used to access files outside the defined areas.
• Execution of Computational Mail In A Localised Environment.
This approach uses the rationale that if all security measure proves insufficient and that some form of damage will occur in the recipient's machine, then it would be better to localise and contain the damage within some defined environment. This translates into the execution of CEmail in a designated low-privilege environment where no access to the normal file system is permitted. In a DOS OS-based system, one can adopt the use of multiple disk drives and configure the mail system to access only the designated CEmail drive but no others where critical data and software are stored. In addition, one can design and build some simple hardware that permits the power supply to such critical drives be switched off (after forcing a data save on all currently active processes) upon activation of the mail system. The mail system will thus be confined to access the only remaining CEmail drive. In order to minimise infection or attacks by computer viruses or Trojan horses, files written by the CEmail should be scanned for viruses prior to the termination of the mail system, particularly if these files are to be processed, copied to anywhere else within the computer system, or transmitted to other users (via email). Other remaining files can be deleted automatically or interactively by the user. Executable files can be moved to a 'quarantine' environment and isolated from the normal resources prior to execution. Deactivation of the mail system is subsequently followed by a re-boot of the machine that will restore the power supply back to all disks. It is essential that the hardware circuit disallow software to restore the power supply to the critical disks to prevent smart attacks.
Alternatively, different disk partitions can be created to support both the DOS and UNIX OS with the CEmail being executed under the UNIX environment using the aforementioned security measures. Such a measure may prove cumbersome in practice, but it ensures that other system resources remain safe. In the extreme situation, separate computer systems can be exclusively dedicated to execute CEmail.
• Institutionalising A Set of Security Procedures or Policies.
In order to advocate or ensure the safe use of CEmail, a set of security procedures or policies should be formulated and followed. Such an approach is essential for organisations where CEmail is used routinely. It may be possible for CEmail to be classified into different security levels by the security manager and assigned a different set of procedures and policies. The security manager may parse the CEmail and identify the command set required to execute the mail and correspondingly arrive at a security level. For example, a meeting scheduler application that requires only interactive responses from the user to select a suitable meeting date and time will have least security risk. A command set that requires reading and mail facility will have a higher security risk due to the threat of information theft. In addition, policies relating to human resource can be formulated so that execution of risky mail are carried out only by technically competent personnel.
The localising effect to contain the damage, coupled with proper procedures and policies, can have an impact on security threats of CEmail. Destructive consequences, even if carried out, are contained. For instance, destruction of resources such as deleting files are confined to the localised environment; deprivation of resources such as filling up the hard disk, likewise, is confined to the localised environment without affecting the functionality of the recipient's system. Although the CEmail program can still tie up the CPU, virtual memory or swap space on the recipient's machine by spawning new processes or going into infinite loops, such problems can be handled by means of resource limitations. Proper usage of digital signature techniques provides further prevention of such occurrence by holding the sender liable for such malicious actions.
Conclusion
Security is seen as a major factor that has hampered the large-scale adoption of CEmail systems. This work has reviewed security concerns and suggested a number of new techniques and approaches to further improve security of CEmail. As further research study, the feasibility of applying artificial intelligence techniques to the security manager can be explored. Under this scenario, it may be possible for the security manager to analyse a CEmail and assess potential security threats and advise the recipient accordingly. With the potential applications and payoffs of CEmail been made known and security aspects resolved, CEmail can become the next wave of Internet technology that will have a significant impact in the information technology scene.
